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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last few decades, substantial effort has been devoted to measuring wage rigidity and 
understanding its macroeconomic implications. Macroeconomic theories have singled it out as a 
source of resistance to wage moderation and therefore as a cause of high and persistent 
unemployment (see e.g. Jackman et al., 1991). Moreover, it was suggested that rigid wages can be 
a cause of less frequent changes in prices of products with a high labour share (see Altissimo et 
al., 2006, Alvarez et al., 2006, Dhyne et al., 2006, Vermeulen et al., 2007). In turn, price stickiness 
leads to higher output volatility in response to shocks, which requires larger interest rate changes 
to affect inflation (see e.g. Altissimo et al., 2006). For example, the New-Keynesian model of 
Blanchard and Gali (2007) shows that, under real wage rigidity and price rigidity, the optimal 
monetary policy is no longer focused on inflation targeting, and should instead aim to reduce, 
although not eliminate altogether, the volatility of both inflation and unemployment.  
  Although many papers provide estimates of wage rigidity, few examine the factors underlying 
wage rigidity. For this aim, a comparison between the extent of wage rigidity across well-defined 
samples, such as countries, individuals, or sectors, is needed. This paper investigates the sources 
of wage rigidity using a large matched employer-employee dataset of individual earnings backed 
up with additional firm-level and sector-level data. Labour market rigidities can differ substantially 
between groups of workers and between sectors of economic activity. Analysing differences across 
sectors is a natural approach to finding relevant factors of wage rigidity. In particular, it provides the 
appropriate aggregation level for product market competition and institutional arrangements on 
wage bargaining. In Belgium, wage bargaining takes place primarily at the sector level. The 
outcomes of these collective agreements have a strong influence on individual wages and wage 
changes. However, at the individual firm level, wages may be set above the sector minima, 
creating a wage cushion that enhances flexibility. 
  It is worth looking at the main findings of some previous studies, irrespective of the measure of 
wage rigidity/flexibility adopted. For example, cross-country analyses have highlighted the role of 
labour market institutions, such as unionisation, centralisation, coordination and coverage of wage 
bargaining. Using a cross-country analysis, Dickens et al. (2006) point to national labour market 
institutions as factors explaining differences in the level of downward wage rigidity measured at the 
microeconomic level. More specifically, they show that unionisation and collective bargaining 
coverage at the country level are positively related to wage rigidity. Clar et al. (2007) perform a 
meta-analysis indicating that union density, centralisation of wage bargaining and employment 
protection legislation are negatively related to real wage flexibility in OECD countries. On the 
contrary, coordination of wage bargaining, which allows for internalisation of the effects of wage 
changes on the economy, makes wages more responsive to labour market conditions and 
therefore increases real wage flexibility. Using industry-level data from OECD countries, Holden 
and Wulfsberg (2008) find that downward nominal wage rigidity is higher in countries where 
employment protection legislation is stricter, union density is higher and unemployment is lower.   2
  Differences in wage rigidity according to worker types were pointed out by Campbell (1997). He 
finds that wage flexibility, defined as the responsiveness of occupational wages to aggregate 
unemployment, is higher for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers. Du Caju et al. (2007) 
provide estimates of downward wage rigidity using the same data and methodology as in this 
paper. They highlight differences across occupation, age, wage level, etc. but provide no formal 
statistical tests of these differences. 
  The literature on wage rigidity involving a sectoral dimension is rather limited. Asking 
professional wage-setters about the reasons for wage rigidity, Agell and Bennmarker (2007) find 
that the effects of firms' profits on wages are important in manufacturing and skilled service sectors, 
and less important in unskilled services and in the public sector. They interpret this as an indication 
of incumbent workers' bargaining power and therefore as a possible source of rigidity. Campbell 
(1989, 1991) provides measures of wage flexibility for the United States, Canada and France 
based on the response of sector-level wages to the aggregate unemployment rate and to sector-
specific product demand. Among others, he finds that sectors with a larger percentage of blue-
collar workers are characterised by a higher degree of wage flexibility. His results for the United 
States also indicate that wage flexibility is lower in more capital-intensive sectors. Finally, he finds 
no robust evidence that unionisation reduces wage flexibility. 
  In sum, the existing literature identifies several variables driving wage rigidity, such as those 
related to workers (e.g. occupation), the firm's characteristics (size, sector), production technology 
(capital intensity), or labour market institutions (for example, unionisation and wage bargaining). 
However, none of the studies mentioned above provides statistical tests of differences between the 
categories after controlling for the impact of labour force composition. The composition effects 
might be especially relevant at the sector level, as some sectors demand very specific labour with 
respect to skills. For instance, the construction sector employs a disproportionate number of blue-
collar workers. The aim of this paper is to determine the relevant factors explaining differences in 
wage rigidity across sectors. We evaluate the importance of labour force composition, sector-
specific characteristics such as firm size, capital intensity and competition, and sector-specific 
institutional features related to wage bargaining.We rely on a large microeconomic dataset on 
individual earnings from administrative sources for Belgium over the period 1990-2002. Du Caju et 
al. (2007) use the same dataset and show that there is virtually no downward nominal rigidity 
(DNWR) during this period in Belgium, a country with full automatic indexation of wages. For this 
reason, we focus on downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) which we estimate using the procedure 
described in Dickens and Goette (2006). 
  On the empirical side, alternative measures of wage rigidity have been proposed. There is 
extensive literature measuring wage rigidity with macroeconomic data. Using aggregate data, wage 
flexibility is usually defined as the responsiveness of wages to economic fluctuations, often proxied 
by the unemployment rate (see, for instance, Layard et al., 1991, or the papers considered in Clar 
et al., 2007). In addition, there is a growing volume of studies using microeconomic data. Some of 
these are based on the response of individual wages to economic conditions (e.g. Altonji and 
Devereux, 1999). Some others construct measures of wage rigidity from the evidence of small   3
wage cuts and concentration of wage changes around some natural reference point such as zero 
or the inflation rate (see Kahn, 1997, Card and Hyslop, 1997, or more recently, Dickens et al., 
2006, 2007). 
  Using a large microeconomic dataset provides enough freedom to evaluate DRWR for 
narrowly-defined samples. For example, we are able to estimate DRWR for young blue-collar 
workers in a given industry in a particular year. By doing so, we can better examine differences 
across workers and assess potential effects of workforce composition on sector-level DRWR. 
Although measures of wage flexibility can be obtained by regressing sector-level wage data (as in 
Campbell, 1989, 1991) on aggregate unemployment and sector-level growth, it is more difficult to 
derive such measures for occupational groups since there is no natural proxy for economic 
conditions. Using a measure of wage rigidity based on individual wage data allows us to examine in 
a consistent way differences across workers and differences across sectors. One characteristic of 
our measurement compared to aggregate methods is that we focus on wage changes of workers in 
a continuing employment relationship. Results from Fehr and Goette (2005) for Switzerland and 
Haefke et al. (2008) for the United States indicate that aggregate wage flexibility may be larger 
thanks to a stronger response of entrant wages to economic fluctuations. However, in Belgium the 
existence of pay scales may limit the scope for differentiated pay policy.1 
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset, relevant institutional 
features of the Belgian labour market and sector-specific characteristics, as well as the 
methodology. Results are reported in Section 3. First, we provide some estimates of DRWR. These 
highlight substantial differences across workers and sectors. Second, we examine differences 
across worker types and shed light on the importance of labour force composition effects. Next, we 
investigate additional factors explaining differences in downward real wage rigidity between 
sectors. Section 4 concludes. Appendix A defines the variables used in the paper, while Appendix 
B provides robustness tests with respect to outliers and alternative definitions of variables.  
 
2. Institutional background, data, and methodology 
 
2.1  Institutional background 
 
Some important institutional features of the labour market affect individual wages in Belgium, such 
as indexation and sector-level collective bargaining agreements, which can possibly be 
supplemented with agreements concluded at the firm level. These features explain why Belgium is 
characterised as a country with high real wage rigidity (see Dickens et al., 2006, or Du Caju et al., 
2007). We briefly describe these characteristics of the Belgian labour market. Firstly, as in several 
countries, a minimum wage is legally binding. Also, practically all employees' gross wages are 
 
                                                      
1   Preliminary results indicate no significant difference in DRWR across sectors with different quit or labour 
turnover rates.   4
linked to a consumer price index through an automatic indexation mechanism.2  This effectively 
limits the scope for real wage cuts and explains why Belgium has been characterised as a country 
with high downward real wage rigidity and low nominal wage rigidity. 
  Secondly, as in many other countries, wages in Belgium are largely determined at the sector 
level. The level of gross wages is mainly determined through agreements concluded in joint 
committees set up for each sector of economic activity.3 In many sectors, pay scales are set for 
blue-collar and white-collar workers separately. This may contribute to observed differences in 
wage dynamics for blue- and white-collar workers. Indeed, in the joint committees for blue-collar 
workers, pay scales are primarily fixed in relation to the job description. Variations depending on 
age or length of service are not common. For white-collar workers, the pay scale usually varies not 
only according to category, but also depending on age or tenure.4 The joint committees at the 
sector level are also the main bargaining unit for the negotiations on collective wage increases. 
Quite often, these collective wage increases are defined as a rise in absolute terms of the 
(sometimes only minimum) pay scales, meaning that employees with wages above the scale can 
obtain a lower percentage collective wage increase. For the period under review, a lot of 
employees receive automatic wage increases, negotiated in sector-level collective agreements. 
These depend on age and, to a lesser extent, tenure. 
  In addition, firm-level agreements can complement sector-specific agreements. According to 
the favourability principle in hierarchical wage bargaining, the negotiated wages in these firm-level 
agreements cannot be below the sectoral agreements.5 Decentralised wage setting through single-
employer (SE) wage agreements is very common in the chemicals and transport equipment 
industries, and very rare in the construction and business services sectors. Also firm-level 
agreements are more common in large firms with stronger union representation than in smaller 
firms. Note that union representation is compulsory in firms with 50 employees or more. SE 
collective wage agreements make it possible to take firm-specific features more closely into 
account in the wage-setting process. In Belgium, companies that do not have a firm-level 
agreement tend to stick to the sector agreement. Firms with an SE agreement generally pay more 
and have a more dispersed earnings structure. This provides them with a wage cushion above the 
sector minima, creating some margin of manoeuvre for wage adjustments. Individual data from the 
Belgian Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) show that firms with SE agreements for blue-collar and 
                                                      
2   Specifically, the index considered is the consumer price index excluding alcoholic beverages, tobacco 
and motor fuels. In some segments of the labour market, wages are indexed at fixed points in time (e.g. 
every one to twelve months), while in others, wages are index-linked each time the index exceeds a 
certain threshold (the threshold value is defined as the previous value plus two percent). 
3   They are called joint committees ('commissions paritaires'), because employers and employees share an 
equal representation in them. As the notion of economic sector is sometimes very narrowly defined, the 
number of joint committees exceeds 100. The outcome of these sector-specific negotiations cannot 
undercut the legally determined guaranteed minimum wage. The actual minimum pay by sector, 
occupation and sometimes age or tenure, defined within joint committees, exceeds the legally guaranteed 
minimum. There are some exceptions for workers less than 21 years old. 
4  During the period under review, age-related pay scales were not against European anti-discrimination 
rules and were applicable to the majority of Belgian white-collar workers.  
5   Opt-out clauses are possible but are very rare.   5
white-collar workers pay 12% higher earnings and bonuses are 53% higher. Furthermore, the 
standard deviation of earnings is 2% larger, and that of bonuses is 16% larger in firms with SE 
agreements compared to firms with no SE agreements. In view of these gaps, one may expect to 
find less DRWR in sectors where SE agreements are more common, as is the case when firms are 
larger. 
 
2.2  Data 
 
To measure downward real wage rigidity, we rely on an administrative employer-employee 
database on individual labour earnings for Belgium, collected by the social security system. The 
data contain information on annual gross earnings (including bonuses and compensation for 
overtime hours), annual working days, age, sex and occupation category (blue-collar or white-
collar). The dataset contains a sample of around one-third of workers in the private sector and 
covers the period 1990-2002. It includes all persons that were born between the 5
th and the 15
th 
day of any month, except those employed by firms with less than 5 employees or by independent 
workers. The dataset covers all sectors of activity including services. We focus on in firms active in 
branches with NACE codes from D to K, i.e. we exclude agriculture, extraction industries and non-
commercial services.  
  We restrict the sample to workers above the legal minimum age of compulsory schooling and 
below the retirement age, i.e. men between 18 and 64 and women between 18 and 59. We also 
exclude earnings below the legal minimum wage and we drop the same number of observations 
from the upper tail of the distribution. In this way, we attempt to exclude outliers and possibly 
extreme variations in individual annual earnings. Finally, we restrict the sample to full-time 
permanent job stayers. Since the dataset does not report the type of contract (fixed-term or 
indeterminate length), we define these permanent job stayers as working at least 11 months for the 
same employer over two consecutive years. In this way, we allow permanent workers to have at 
most one month of sick leave (or other "abnormal" days off) per year, in order to distinguish them 
from temporary workers. We refer to Du Caju et al. (2007) for more details on the data.  
  It is important to note that annual earnings include variable compensation components, such as 
bonuses, premia, and overtime hours. Not all of these are subject to automatic increases such as 
indexation and collectively bargained increases. Therefore, annual earnings may be more flexible 
than the base wage. Further, because the importance of extra wage components varies across 
workers, firms and sectors, these may explain differences of wage rigidity across sectors. For 
example, bonuses and premia may be higher for white-collar workers, older and higher-earnings 
employees, while compensation for overtime hours may be more common for blue-collar workers. 
  The individual earnings data are complemented with information from firms' balance sheets.6 
Also, we use individual data from the Belgian Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), for the 1999, 
2000, 2001 and 2002 waves.  
                                                      
6  Annual accounts data in Belgium are (nearly) exhaustive, except for credit institutions, and subject to 
substantial consistency checks.   6
  Individual annual earnings data are used to estimate downward real wage rigidity by 
occupation, age category and sector. These rigidity measures are then related to three types of 
variables, namely worker characteristics, sector characteristics and decentralisation of wage 
bargaining. The first set consists of variables related to worker type. This is the case of the 
occupation dummy that equals unity for blue-collar workers, and of age dummies that identify 
workers aged between 18 and 24 years, those between 25 and 44 years old, and those older than 
45.7 We also consider the median level of earnings, computed from the individual earnings dataset, 
and the median level of bonuses, as reported in the four SES waves between 1999 and 2002. Note 
that this variable includes compensation for overtime hours. 
  The second set of variables describes sectoral characteristics. From firms' balance sheets, we 
define the median firm size as the median within the sector of the number of employees, and the 
capital-labour ratio as the median within the sector of firm-specific capital-labour ratios. Moreover, 
we estimate a measure of competition recently proposed by Boone et al. (2007), i.e. the elasticity 
of a firm's profits with respect to its marginal costs (profit elasticity). The intuition behind profit 
elasticity is that firms in less competitive sectors are not pure price takers, hence a given 
percentage increase in costs can be accommodated by a price rise, in turn leading to a smaller fall 
in profits. The profit elasticity is thus larger for more competitive firms. Using firm-level data for 
each branch, we regress log profits on log variable costs (for more details on theoretical derivation 
as well as its relation to other measures of competition, see Appendix A). As a robustness test, we 
also consider two alternative measures of competition: the Herfindahl index which measures 
concentration within the sector, and sector-specific estimates of the price cost margin given by 
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2007). As argued in Boone et al. (2007), the three measures would 
correctly capture strengthened competition resulting from a fall in entry costs and a consequent 
increase in the number of firms. However, the Herfindahl index fails to capture any increase in 
competition that might cause inefficient firms to close down, because in such a case, concentration 
in the industry increases. It would nevertheless be misleading to interpret this as a fall in 
competition. Further, these authors argue that empirical measures of the price-cost margin, such 
as the ratio of profits to sales, may be less suited in highly concentrated markets. The estimates of 
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2007) rely on the estimation of structural equation, but they are 
time-invariant. Because the profit elasticity overcomes the drawback of the other measures and is 
time-varying, it is our preferred measure of competition. 
  Finally, the third type of variable refers to sectoral wage bargaining practices, i.e. the coverage 
by collective wage agreements at the sector or firm level. For Europe in general and Belgium in 
particular, this provides a much better indicator of union bargaining power than union membership, 
for example. The reason is that, unlike in the US, wage agreements are negotiated between 
employers' representatives and workers' representatives, but apply to all workers, regardless of 
whether they are unionised or not. As explained above, sector-level multi-employer agreements 
apply generally in Belgium. As an indicator of decentralised wage setting, we calculate the average 
                                                      
7   The thresholds are defined so as to have enough observations of individual earnings changes in each 
category to estimate DRWR.   7
proportion over time (1999-2002) of workers covered by a single-employer (SE) wage agreement, 
from the SES dataset. Such agreements are expected to provide the firm with more flexibility as 
compared to the multi-employer (ME) agreements. Moreover, firms applying SE agreements are 
more likely to negotiate individually wage conditions that are more favourable than those of the 
collective agreement for part of their workforce, as indicated by a larger wage dispersion in firms 
that have their own wage agreement. Appendix A gives more information on data sources and 
definitions. 
  Table 1 provides information on sectoral differences in the variables of interest. For example, 
the proportion of blue-collar workers is very large in the construction and other manufacturing 
sectors, and very low in financial and business services. Earnings and bonuses are particularly 
high in the chemical industry and in financial services. At the other extreme, earnings and bonuses 
are the lowest in the construction, and hotels and restaurants sectors. Turning to production 
characteristics, chemicals, non-metal manufacturing, transport storage and business services are 
capital-intensive sectors, while construction is the most labourintensive industry. Firms are larger in 
chemicals, textiles and transport equipment industries, and smaller in services.  
 



























food  41.66 36.15 72.41 2671  6  17.8  7.957 35.50 
textile  33.62 36.75 58.35  968  11  11.1  9.514 11.34 
wood  and  paper  43.54 36.84 79.10 2326  4  18.5  7.436 27.51 
chemicals  60.27 37.87  101.34 4122  13  20.7  7.809 54.80 
non  metal  34.39 38.86 78.24 2292  7  20.5  8.514 37.49 
metal  35.08 38.44 81.63 2509  7  13.8  8.119 38.65 
machinery  and  equip.  47.51 37.46 81.11 2930  7  10.6  8.642 30.54 
transport  equipment  28.27 37.55 89.84 2428  11  11.4  9.877 42.89 
other  manufacturing  22.93 36.81 60.73 1327  5  12.3  9.159 14.44 
construction  21.29 36.77 68.86  875  4  10.0  8.432  2.38 
trade    72.58 36.20 71.02 3073  3  14.5  9.821 15.10 
hotels  and  restaurants  36.87 34.12 53.67  354  3  11.8  8.189 10.15 
transport  and  storage  46.14 37.41 74.29 1772  5  22.4  5.784 20.58 
financial  services  97.79 38.44  104.34 6043  2  16.2  5.473 34.02 
business  services  83.13 35.13 83.64 3354  2  19.5  6.007  3.61 
Mean  47.01 36.99 77.24 2469  6.0  15.4  8.049 25.27 
Standard  deviation  22.25 1.26 14.34 1415  3.4  4.20 1.388  15.54 
Notes:  
a Gross total daily earnings in euro. 
  b  Annual bonuses in euro.
 
  
c Number of employees. 
  
d Median capital-labour ratio measured in thousands of euro.
 
  e  Values calculated for each branch and year. The table reports median over years. 
  
f Percentage of blue-collar workers employed in firms with single-employer agreement. 
 
  According to the profit elasticity, competition is fiercer in other manufacturing, transport 
equipment and trade and low in business, financial services and in transport and storage. Note that 
alternative indicators of competition are not always consistent with the profit elasticity. We therefore 
evaluate the robustness of our results with respect to the choice of competition indicator in the   8
appendix. Finally, it should be noted that decentralised bargaining through SE agreements is much 
more widespread in the chemical industry and is essentially absent in the construction and 
business services, i.e. in sectors with centralised bargaining. 
 
2.3  Methodology 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of the differences in DRWR across workers and sectors. 
We focus on DRWR because previous results characterise Belgium as a country with one of the 
highest levels of DRWR and one of the lowest levels of DNWR (Dickens et al., 2007, Du Caju et 
al., 2007), consistent with the system of automatic wage indexation. For this purpose, we proceed 
in two steps. First, we estimate DRWR year by year for each group, defined either by occupation, 
age and sector, or simply by sector of economic activity. Second, we regress our measure of 
DRWR on a set of potential explanatory variables. 
 
2.3.1  Measuring downward real wage rigidity 
 
  Our measure of DRWR is based on the methodology described in Dickens and Goette (2006).8 
This measure attempts to capture the fraction of workers who would not receive a real wage cut 
when they were due for one, no matter what the reason for the wage cut. Briefly, the method is 
based on the comparison of the observed distribution of individual nominal wage changes with the 
notional distribution, i.e. the one that would prevail under perfect wage flexibility. The latter is 
assumed to be symmetric. On the contrary, downward wage rigidity typically generates asymmetry 
and spikes around the reference point. The reference point for real wage rigidity is expected 
inflation, and that for nominal wage rigidity is zero. Indeed, wage changes that would have fallen 
below the reference point under perfect flexibility will appear at or above the reference point in the 
observed distribution. Therefore, the observed distribution of individual wage changes will be 
characterised by fewer observations below the median than above it, i.e. it will be asymmetric. 
Moreover, wage changes that would have been below the reference point under perfect flexibility 
may be concentrated at the reference point, generating a spike in the observed distribution of wage 
changes. As an illustration, figure 1 below shows the histogram of earnings changes for textiles in 
2002. The asymmetry of the distribution is quite clear, as is the spike around the collective wage 
increase level. 
 
                                                      
8   We make the following choice of the parameters., We allow the mean of π
e to be unrestricted in the 0-4 
percent band and its variance to range from 4E-06 to 3.6E-05. See Du Caju et al. (2007) for a discussion 
on specification issues. In Du Caju et al. (2007) we provide a more detailed description of the procedure 
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Figure 1 - Distribution of earnings changes for the textile industry in year 2002 
Note:  grey solid line shows the economy-wide CPI inflation while the yellow line is the economy-wide total 
collective wage increase. 
 
  Dickens and Goette (2006) propose a Mixed Method of Moments estimator to evaluate the 
extent of DNWR, the level of DRWR as well as the reference point for real wage rigidity. This 
method has been applied within the International Wage Flexibility Project (Dickens et al., 2007), 
and more recently in the Wage Dynamics Network for Belgium (Du Caju et al., 2007), Messina et 
al., 2008). The method offers several advantages. First, the reference point for real wage rigidity, 
i.e. expected inflation, is directly estimated from the data rather than provided by the 
econometrician based on outside estimates. Second, the method takes into account measurement 
errors in the wage changes variable. Third, it requires only information on wage changes. However, 
because it is based on the estimated distribution of wage changes, it demands datasets with a 
large cross-section dimension. Among its drawbacks is the fact that identifying DRWR and DNWR 
becomes an issue in years with very low inflation, where the reference point for DRWR comes very 
close to zero, i.e. the reference point for DNWR. 
  Another strand of the literature proposes alternative measures of downward wage rigidity 
based on the idea that it implies a smaller response of wages to adverse shocks than to positive 
outcomes (see, for example, Altonji and Devereux, 1999, or Biscourp et al., 2005). The concept is 
appealing because it takes into account the motives to cut wages, but it is very demanding in terms 
of data as it requires information on relevant workers’ and firms’ characteristics. 
  Note that, on the one hand, the resistance to wage cuts following negative events implies that 
the distribution of wage changes is asymmetric should any negative shocks occur. On the other   10
hand, if one observes asymmetry in the distribution of wage changes, one should a fortiori find that 
wages do not respond to negative signals. Therefore the two approaches should lead to identical 
conclusions about the presence of downward of wage rigidity. A more important difference arises 
with respect to estimates of the sensitivity of wages to shocks at a more aggregated level. 
Consider, for example, an adverse shock. Firms may reduce their average wage bill by changing 
the composition of their workforce, even if the wages of job stayers do not fall. In this case, the 
distribution of individual earnings changes will exhibit no wage cuts, while the estimation of 
aggregate wage sensitivity will suggest that the average wage has fallen. 
 
2.3.2  Explaining differences in DRWR across sectors 
 
In order to test formally for differences across worker types and the importance of workforce 
composition in explaining differences in DRWR across sectors, we proceed in two steps. First, we 
estimate DRWR using the IWFP procedure described in the previous subsection. Second, the 
estimates of DRWR serve as dependent variables in regression equations with explanatory factors 
entering as independent variables. We disregard DNWR because our previous findings have 
shown it to be of little of importance for Belgium (Du Caju et al., 2007). 
  The dataset enables 90 categories to be considered for each year, defined as the combination 
of 15 branches, 2 occupation categories and 3 age groups. We consider two occupational 
categories (blue-collar and white-collar workers) and three age groups (18-24 years, 25-44 years, 
and 45 years or more). Branches have been defined as follows: (1) food (food products, beverages 
and tobacco), (2) textile (textiles, textile products, leather and footwear), (3) wood and paper (wood 
and products of wood and cork, and pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing), (4) 
chemicals (chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products), (5) non-metal (other non-metallic mineral 
products), (6) metal (basic metals and fabricated metal products), (7) machinery and equipment, 
(8) transport equipment, (9) other manufacturing (manufacturing n.e.c., recycling), (10) 
construction, (11) trade (wholesale and retail trade, repair), (12) hotels and restaurants, (13) 
transport and storage, (14) financial services (financial intermediation), (15) business services (real 
estate, renting and business activities). In order to keep enough observations in each category to 
estimate DRWR, we exclude categories with less than 2,000 observations of earnings changes. 
Also, we do not consider energy (electricity, gas and water supply) and transport and 
communication (post and telecommunications) because  either the estimates of DRWR are not 
reliable or the observations appear to be outliers in the regressions estimated below. We also rule 
out estimates of DRWR that hit the boundary of zero or one as being unreliable (142 cases). 
  We perform two types of analysis. First of all, we test for significant differences in DRWR 
across workers. Secondly, we examine factors that explain differences in DRWR across sectors. In 
the first case, we estimate DRWR for each year, occupational group, age group and sector. 
Formally, we denote the estimates of downward real wage rigidity as DRWRkajt, where k stands for 
occupation category (blue-collar or white-collar), a for age categories, while the sector is   11
represented by the subscript j and the year by t. The regression equations that we estimate take 
the following form: 
 
 DRWRkajt = αt + β1 D white-collarkajt + β2 D age:25-44kajt + β3 D age:45+kajt + β4 Xkajt + εkajt,     (1) 
 
where αt is a time-varying constant, D indicates that the variable is a dummy and Xkajt stands for a 
continuous explanatory variable, like earnings or bonuses. 
  In the second case, in order to analyse the impact of workforce composition, technology, 
competition and bargaining institutions on differences in DRWR across sectors, we follow the same 
idea as above, except that we now only estimate DRWR across 15 sectors and over several years. 
In the following regression, our explanatory variables are defined only over sectors and years. We 
control for workforce composition by adding the average age of workers and the percentage of 
blue-collar workers, both defined by sector and year. We consider the effect of each explanatory 
variable on its own after controlling for workforce composition. In a later stage, we combine the 
explanatory variables into a single model along the following lines: 
 
 DRWRjt = αt + β1 agejt + β2 blue-collarjt + β3 sizejt + β4 K/Lj + β5 profit elasticityjt + 
      +   β6 SE coveragejt + εjt,                               ( 2 )  
 
where K/L is the capital-labour ratio, profit elasticity is our preferred measure of competition and SE 
coverage stands for the percentage of blue-collar workers covered by single-employer collective 
agreements. 
  Estimates of equations (1) and (2) by OLS may nevertheless be plagued by several 
econometric problems. First, in Section 3.3 we take into account potential endogeneity of the profit 
elasticity, and consider estimation with instrumental variables to correct for the simultaneity bias. 
Second, our dependent variable can only take on values between 0 and 1, while under the 
standard assumption of an OLS model with fixed explanatory variables and normally distributed 
error term, the dependent variable should be also normally distributed. Models for dependent 
variables that vary on the [0.1] interval were developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) who 
propose a generalised linear regression model and use quasi-maximum likelihood method (QML) 
for its estimation. In Appendix B2, we re-estimate all the models presented in the paper and 
conclude that the point estimates of coefficients estimated by QML and OLS are very similar. This 
is not surprising in the light of the results that we obtained from specification error tests of the OLS 
model. Using Ramsey's (1969) regression error specification error test (RESET), we conclude in all 
cases that the OLS models do not suffer from specification error (see Appendix B2 for more 
details). Third, our estimated standard errors may be downwards biased because some variables 
are estimated or proxied rather than truly observed. For instance, the profit elasticity is a generated 
regressor. Lastly, some explanatory variables are time-invariant, such as the capital to labour ratio   12
and the decentralisation of wage bargaining.9 However, given the small number of time periods 
(12) and sectors (15), our view is that using sophisticated econometric corrections (such as 
bootstrap methods or clustered robust standard errors) is beyond the scope of what can be learned 
from our data. It should be noted that the above-mentioned issues do not affect the point estimates 
of the coefficients. 
 
3.  Results 
 
In Section 3.1, we introduce the values of DRWR that were estimated by the IWFP procedure and 
compare the average levels across age and occupation categories and across sectors. We discuss 
possible explanations for the differences and compare the results with other findings in the 
literature. Section 3.2 tests the importance of workforce composition effects for DRWR in a model 
varying over sectors, age and occupation categories and time. At the same time, we consider the 
effect of earnings level and bonuses on DRWR. Section 3.3 focuses solely on differences across 
sectors and analyses DRWR varying only across sectors and years. We investigate the role of firm 
size, capital to labour ratio, profit elasticity and decentralisation of wage bargaining. We examine 
the effect of each explanatory variable on its own after controlling for workforce composition. 
Finally, the explanatory variables are combined into a single model which is then used to 
decompose the contribution of each variable to sector-specific DRWR. Robustness tests with 
respect to the estimation issues discussed in the preceding section are reported in Appendix B. 
 
3.1  Estimates of downward real wage rigidity 
 
Table 2 presents the average values of DRWR for the sectors and worker categories considered in 
this paper. The average DRWR across sectors, equal to 0.58, is in line with our previous findings 
(see Du Caju et al., 2007) and points towards strong downward real wage rigidity in Belgium. Such 
a high value ranks Belgium as the country with the highest DRWR among the 16 countries 
participating in the Inflation Wage Flexibility Project (cf. Figure 4 in Dickens et al., 2006).  
  Table 2 documents that white-collar workers have more rigid earnings than blue-collar workers. 
The numbers reported in Table 2 imply that the estimated fraction of white-collar workers subject to 
DRWR is 10 percentage points higher than that of blue-collar workers. The same conclusion was 
reported by Campbell (1997) for the US, based on the observation that wages of white-collar 
workers are much less responsive to the aggregate unemployment rate than blue-collar workers' 
wages. This result is consistent with the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and with the 
turnover model of Stiglitz (1974). These models are based on the idea that firms may be less 
inclined to cut wages of white-collar workers because they are more difficult (costly) to replace and 
                                                      
9   Indeed, robustness tests (not reported for the sake of brevity) that take into account intra-class 
correlation, indicate that robust standard errors are larger than the OLS estimates. This results from the 
fact that under intra-class correlation, each observation contains less unique information and the effective 
sample size is reduced.   13
to monitor, and therefore are more likely to shirk their jobs. Franz and Pfeiffer (2006) report survey 
evidence for Germany indicating that the main reasons for wage rigidity of high-skilled workers are 
the existence of specific skills and the negative signal a wage cut may represent for newly-hired 
staff. On the contrary, wage rigidity of less-skilled workers is mainly attributable to labour union 
contracts and implicit contracts. In Belgium, in addition, white-collar workers obtain automatic wage 
increases with age or tenure, while this is rarely the case for blue-collar workers. This makes white-
collar workers less likely to experience real wage cuts. 
 
Table 2 - Estimates of DRWR 
Category  average DRWR st. dev. 
Blue-collar workers  0.580  0.261 
White-collar workers  0.641  0.213 
Workers aged 18-24 years  0.630  0.217 
Workers aged 25-44 years  0.593  0.230 
Workers older than 44 years  0.612  0.265 
food 0.526  0.126 
textile 0.600  0.178 
wood and paper  0.648  0.108 
chemicals 0.467  0.173 
non-metal 0.483  0.101 
metal 0.553  0.142 
machinery and equip.  0.618  0.081 
transport equipment  0.517  0.115 
other manufacturing  0.681  0.277 
construction 0.801  0.239 
trade   0.648  0.188 
hotels and restaurants  0.590  0.214 
transport and storage  0.354  0.145 
financial services  0.627  0.195 
business services  0.668  0.114 
Entire sample (av. over sectors)  0.581  0.193 
Notes: DRWR estimated by the IWFP procedure, see Section 2. Results for sectors are averaged over years 
and the entire sample is the average over sectors and years. Results for occupational categories and age 
categories were obtained as averages from estimates of DRWR varying across occupation, age, sectors and 
years. 
 
  Young workers (aged between 18 and 24 years) have more rigid earnings than older workers, 
consistent with previous findings in Du Caju et al. (2007). The result may be explained by the 
shirking model and the adverse selection model of Weiss (1980) applied to job quits. It predicts that 
younger workers are more likely to quit when their earnings increases are below their expected 
bargaining reference point because the cost of job loss is smaller for them than for older workers, 
i.e. finding a job is more difficult for older workers and, in addition, they might lose their tenure-
related component of compensation. Furthermore, automatic tenure and age-related wage 
increases are more prominent for younger workers, while extra wage components are smaller, 
leading to less flexible earnings.  
  The estimates of DRWR across sectors highlight substantial variation; DRWR ranges from 0.35 
to 0.80. The highest DRWR is observed in the following sectors: construction, business services, 
trade, and wood and paper. Sectors with the lowest degree of DRWR are transport and storage   14
and chemicals. Below, we consider a range of factors that can explain these differences in DRWR 
across workers and sectors. 
 
3.2  Workforce characteristics and composition effects 
 
In Table 2, we first test formally whether there are differences in DRWR across workers, then 
consider the impact of payroll policies on the level of DRWR. More specifically, we regress our 
measure of DRWR estimated for each year, occupation, age group and sector, on dummies for 
occupation and age category. We then expand the equation with the median earnings and median 
bonus per category. Table 2 presents the results estimated by least squares, Appendix B shows 
that the results are robust to accounting for a dependent variable bounded between zero and one.  
 
Table 3 - OLS estimates of eq. (1), DRWR per year, occupation, age category and sector 
Dep. v. DRWRkajt  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
D white-collarkajt 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.133*** 0.109*** 
  (4.05) (5.11) (5.12) (4.98) 
D age:25-44kajt -0.051**  -0.059***  -0.021 -0.022 
  (-2.29) (-2.74) (-0.89) (-0.91) 
D age:45+kajt -0.032  -0.047**  0.006  0.018 
 (-1.44)  (-2.20)  (0.25)  (0.62) 
bonuskaj
†     -0.030***   
         (-3.23)   
earningskajt
†       -1.790*** 
           (-2.88) 
Constant 0.488***  0.479*** 0.493*** 0.562*** 
 (13.88)  (10.98)  (14.11) (12.94) 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Sector  dummies  no yes  no no 
R²adj  0.056 0.199 0.068 0.065 
Number of obs.  758  758  758  758 
F test for sector 
dummies [p-value]   
11.30 
[0.000]    
Notes: 
† measured in thousands of euro.   
    */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
    t-statistics in brackets. 
 
  Model (1) shows that the earnings of white-collar workers are significantly more rigid than those 
of blue-collar workers. DRWR is highest for workers aged between 18 and 24 years, however, the 
difference between the youngest and oldest worker category is not statistically significant. One 
particular reason is that coefficients in Model (1) reflect both the variation in DRWR across sectors 
and within sectors. In Model (2) we add sector dummies, thus effectively removing the variation 
across sectors, and conclude that workers between 18 and 24 years have a significantly higher 
degree of rigidity than the remaining two categories when only the variation within sectors is 
considered. The increase in the coefficient of determination from 0.06 in Model (1) to 0.20 in Model 
(2) suggests that sector-specific factors contribute to explaining DRWR beyond the effects of 
occupation and age. By running an F-test for equality of the sector dummies in Model (2), we 
conclude that the differences across sectors are statistically significant.   15
  As discussed in Section 2.1, one of the reasons why younger workers may have more rigid 
wages is that the fraction of labour compensation due to flexible components such as bonuses and 
premia is typically smaller for younger people. Because these can be easily cut, earnings should be 
less rigid the larger the bonuses. Indeed, models (3) and (4) show that DRWR is lower for worker 
categories and sectors with a higher bonuses and earnings.10 Further, when bonuses are included 
in equation (1), age dummies are no longer significant. In the same vein, DRWR is lower for higher-
earning categories. Besides the argument related to bonuses and premia, another explanation is 
that low wages are close to the institutional minimum wage or to sectoral pay scales and therefore 
cannot be reduced freely. Lastly, wage levels are typically higher and more dispersed in firms with 
SE wage agreements as opposed to sector-level or multi-employer (ME) agreements.11 As argued 
by Cardoso and Portugal (2005), higher and more dispersed wages in firms with SE agreements 
provide employers with a flexible wage cushion over and above the sectoral minima. This yields 
more flexibility in wage adjustment. We examine this issue in more detail in the next section. 
  In sum, we have shown that earnings of white-collar workers and workers between 18 and 24 
years are significantly more rigid than those of blue-collar workers and older workers. Further, age-
related aspects may explain inter-sectoral differences across workers rather than inter-sectoral 
differences in DRWR. The results also suggest that sector-specific factors should contribute to 
explaining DRWR beyond the effects of occupation and age. Finally, as expected, bonuses and 
higher earnings generally tend to lower downward real wage rigidity. 
 
3.3  Sector-specific factors driving DRWR: technology, competition and institutions 
 
In order to analyse additional factors that drive differences in DRWR across sectors, like 
technology, competition and wage-bargaining institutions, we consider a dataset that varies only 
across sectors and over time. We estimate similar equations to those used in the previous section, 
except that we replace age and occupation dummies by average age and the percentage of blue-
collar workers per sector and year to control for workforce composition.  
  We disregard the earnings level and bonuses because these variables are the outcome of the 
firm’s compensation policy, as is DRWR, and are therefore potentially endogenous. We prefer to 
keep variables that are independent of the firm's pay policy, such as competition indicators, capital 
intensity or SE agreement coverage. 
  Table 4 reveals that, with the exception of two models, average age and the percentage of 
blue-collar workers are not statistically significant. Combined with our previous results presented in 
Table 3, we can conclude that earnings of older workers and blue-collar workers are less rigid, 
                                                      
10   These results are robust to considering the average earnings and the average bonus instead of the 
medians. For space considerations, the results are not reported but are available on request. 
11   See also evidence in Card and de la Rica (2006), Cardoso and Portugal (2005), Dell' Aringa and Lucifora 
(1994), Gerlach and Stephan (2006), Palenzuela and Jimeno (1996) and, for Belgium, Rycx (2003). See 
also the figures reported in Section 2.1.   16
whatever the sector of economic activity. However, differences across sectors in the average age 
do not explain differences in DRWR across sectors. 
  Least squares estimates of equation (2) are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Robustness with respect 
to Papke and Wooldridge's (1996) estimation that takes into account the bounded nature of DRWR 
(between zero and one) are reported in Appendix B. The size of the coefficients and the 
significance is similar. 
 
Table 4 - Sector-specific factors affecting DRWR, OLS estimates 
Dep. var. DRWRjt  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
agejt  -0.021*  -0.006 -0.012 -0.020*  0.016 
    (-1.91) (-0.52) (-1.11) (-1.84) (1.14) 
blue-collarsjt -0.000  0.001  -0.002**  -0.001*  -0.000 
  (-0.42) (0.79)  (-2.32) (-1.71) (-0.74) 
sizejt    -13.90***      
    (-2.91)      
K/Lj     -0.017***   
     (-4.91)    
Profit elasticityjt      0.029**   
      (2.42)   
SE coveragej      - 0 . 0 0 5 * * *
      ( - 4 . 1 7 )  
Constant 1.264***  0.762*  1.252*** 1.080*** 0.055 
  (3.11) (1.76) (3.29) (2.65) (0.11) 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector  dummies  no no no no no 
R²adj  0.085 0.126 0.201 0.112 0.171 
Number  of  obs.  173 173 173 173 173 
Notes:  
 agejt is the average age of workers;  
 blue-collarsjt is the percentage of blue-collar workers; 
 sizejt  is the average size of firms, measured in thousands of employees; 
 K/Lj is the capital-labour ratio, measured in thousands of euro; 
 Profit  elasticityjt is our preferred measure of competition 
 SE  coveragej is the percentage of blue-collar workers covered by single-employer collective agreements 
   */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
   t-statistics in brackets. 
 
  Next, we examine whether the median firm size within the sector affects wage rigidity. There 
are several reasons why firm size might affect DRWR. Union representation is compulsory in firms 
with more than 50 employees in Belgium, which may ease the negotiation of wage concessions in 
adverse times. Also, larger firms typically have more complex compensation structures, offer higher 
but also more dispersed wages12, and possibly a larger amount of extra wage components. Also 
they are more likely to sign SE agreements, which allow for a more flexible wage policy than the 
sectoral agreements. Earnings decreases in smaller firms are more likely to be bounded by minima 
collectively agreed outside the firm. On the contrary, in larger firms, the wage cushion (above the 
                                                      
12   This is also the case in our sample. For example, the average earnings in firms with less than 25 
employees are 30 percent lower than those in firms with more than 500 employees, as is the standard 
deviation of earnings. More importantly, the mean and standard deviation of earnings changes are 15 
percent lower for smaller firms compared to larger firms.   17
sector-level agreement) provides some margin for earnings cuts. Model (2) in Table 4 confirms 
these arguments. DRWR is significantly lower in sectors with larger firms, all else equal.  
  We also study whether production technology and market competition are related to DRWR. 
First, we introduce the median capital-labour ratio for each sector in Model (3). Our estimates 
indicate that labour-intensive sectors have higher DRWR. Note that labour-intensive sectors such 
as construction, textiles and transport equipment, for example, also have a larger proportion of 
blue-collar workers (see Table 1), whose wages are less rigid. Table 4 shows that capital intensity 
is negatively related to DRWR after controlling for labour force composition. Our results contrast 
with the findings of Campbell (1991), who reports a negative correlation between sector-level wage 
flexibility and the capital-labour ratio in the US. But they are consistent with the finding in Fuss 
(2008) that wage cuts in adverse times are largely non-existent in the construction sector (the most 
labour-intensive) contrary to the manufacturing and services sectors. Also, our finding that wage 
rigidity is stronger in labour-intensive sectors complements the view expressed by the Eurosystem 
Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) that the higher degree of price stickiness observed in more 
labour-intensive sectors might result from wage rigidity, see Altissimo et al. (2006), Álvarez et al. 
(2006), Dhyne et al. (2006) and Vermeulen et al. (2006).13 
  In Model (4), we report results for competition measured through the profit elasticity proposed 
by Boone et al. (2007) and estimated at the sector level. Controlling for age and occupation, our 
estimates indicate that sectors with stronger competition experience higher DRWR. One potential 
explanation is related to wage-bargaining practices. SE wage agreements are more common in 
sectors where firms are large and have higher market power and where company unions try to 
appropriate the rents. SE wage agreements are far less common in sectors with small competitive 
firms. In this case, the main objective of unions is rather egalitarian as they are trying to avoid a 
wage race to the bottom; they are mainly organised at sectoral level in order to negotiate equal pay 
within the sector. Note that our finding of a positive relationship between product market 
competition and DRWR should be treated with some caution. Appendix B provides results based 
on two additional measures of competition: the Herfindahl index and the price-cost margin. Even 
though the estimates based on these alternative measures predict the same direction of the impact 
of competition on DRWR, the coefficients are not statistically significant (see Table B2).  
  Finally, we examine whether differences in decentralisation of wage bargaining across sectors 
influence DRWR. In the literature, wage-bargaining institutions have been cited as a cause of 
differences in downward wage rigidity across countries. Dickens et al. (2006) and Holden and 
Wulfsberg (2008) relate higher wage rigidity to higher union density and/or bargaining coverage. In 
the context of our paper, we examine whether sectoral differences in the wage-bargaining 
mechanism are related to sectoral differences in wage rigidity. As mentioned above, inter-sectoral 
coordination practices and indexation mechanisms are largely determined at the national level. 
                                                      
13   Our measure of DRWR is negatively related to the sector-specific frequency of monthly producer price 
changes in the manufacturing sector, computed as in Cornille and Dossche (2008). This suggests that 
sectors with higher DRWR also experience higher price rigidity. The correlation coefficient between 
DRWR and the frequency of producer price change reaches -0.67. We thank M. Dossche for providing us 
with the estimates of the frequency of producer price change.   18
These are common to all sectors and may explain the high level of DRWR in Belgium compared to 
other countries. Beyond this, sector-level collective wage bargaining plays a dominant role in wage-
setting practices. On top of these, other bargaining characteristics, such as the proportion of firms 
with SE agreements, vary across sectors. As mentioned above, firm-level or single-employer (SE) 
agreements lead to higher wages on average, as well as wider wage dispersion across firms 
because such agreements can better take into account firm-specific characteristics in the 
determination of wages.14 In addition, according to Cardoso and Portugal (2005), a higher average 
wage and wider wage dispersion within firms provide employers with a flexible wage cushion above 
the sectoral minima, leaving these firms with a wider range of options in their wage-setting policy, 
i.e. allowing a greater role for workers' and firms’ characteristics in remuneration. This, in turn, is 
expected to reduce downward real wage rigidity. This prediction is confirmed in Model (5) in Table 
4. Downward real wage rigidity is lower in sectors with a higher proportion of workers covered by 
an additional firm-level wage agreement.  
  In Table 5, we combine the explanatory variables discussed so far into a single model. It has 
already been suggested that the variables might be collinear which would, in turn, give rise to 
imprecise estimates of the coefficients in the combined model. For example, larger firms typically 
offer higher and more dispersed wages. And companies with firm-level agreements are generally 
larger, and pay higher wages. As before, we omit from the model the earnings level and 
bonuses.15 One may argue that these variables are the outcome of the firm’s compensation policy, 
as is DRWR, and are therefore potentially endogenous. We prefer to use variables that are 
independent of the firm's pay policy, such as competition indicators, capital intensity or SE 
agreement coverage. 
  In Model C1 in Table 5, there are two variables that are insignificant at the 10 percent level. 
One of them is age. Since we concluded that age does not explain the variation in DRWR across 
sectors, we exclude it from the remaining models. The other insignificant variable is profit elasticity, 
but it is only marginally insignificant (with p-value of 0.12). Model C3 suggests that this may be due 
to its correlation with the capital-labour ratio. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, the profit elasticity is 
higher, i.e. competition is stronger, in less capital-intensive sectors. The significant variables in 
Model C1 have the predicted sign and the values of the coefficients are of the same order of 
magnitude as in Table 4. 
  Model C1 may also be affected by endogeneity of profit elasticity. In Appendix A in the section 
that discusses the estimation of profit elasticity, we show that profit elasticity might depend on 
marginal costs (our example is based on a simple Cournot model). Since DRWR may influence 
wage dynamics, it also affects costs and thereby the profit elasticity and causes simultaneity in our 
regression model. We account for the potential simultaneity bias by estimating Model C2 with 
                                                      
14  S ee Card and de la Rica (2006), Cardoso and Portugal (2005), Dell'Aringa and Lucifora (1994), Gerlach 
and Stephan (2006), Hibbs and Lock (1996), Palenzuela and Jimeno (1996) and Rycx (2003) for Belgium. 
15   The wage level and bonuses are highly collinear with the other variables included in the equation. 
Regressing the earnings level on the remaining explanatory variables excluding bonuses yields a 
coefficient of determination of 0.67; while the R² for the regression of bonuses on the other variables 
without the earnings level reaches 0.81.   19
instrumental variables for profit elasticity. We use the following instruments for profit elasticity: the 
Herfindahl index, number of firms per branch (and year) and the relative net increase in the number 
of firms in each branch and year. The model is estimated by two-stage least squares.16 In Model 
C4, the coefficient on profit elasticity increases and becomes significant when compared to Models 
C1 and C2. On the other hand, the capital-labour ratio loses its significance. The estimates of the 
remaining coefficients are broadly in line with the previous estimates. 
 
Table 5 - Explaining differences in DRWR across sectors, composite models 
Dep. var. DRWRjt Model  C1  Model C2  Model C3  Model C4 
Est. method  OLS  OLS  OLS 2SLS 
agejt 0.017       
 (1.24)       
blue-collarsjt -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001  -0.002** 
     (-1.85)  (-1.73)  (-1.52)  (-2.14) 
sizejt -11.012*  -10.764*  -11.833** -14.900** 
     (-1.88)  (-1.83)  (-1.98)  (-2.28) 
K/Lj -0.011***  -0.012***    -0.072 
 (-2.62)  (-2.77)    (-1.40) 
Profit elasticityjt 0.023  0.021  0.041***  0.049** 
     (1.65)  (1.49)  (3.44)  (2.13) 
SE coverage j -0.002*  -0.002  -0.002**  -0.001 
 (-1.74)  (-1.28)  (-2.06)  (-1.18) 
Constant 0.091  0.685*** 0.381*** 0.465** 
 (0.18)  (4.95)  (4.42)  (2.33) 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sector dummies  no  no  no  no 
R²adj 0.254  0.252  0.220  0.233 
Number of obs.  173  173  173  173 
F test for excluded 
instruments equal to 0   
 
 31.831 
[p-val.]      [0.000] 
Sargan's χ
2 test       2.875 
[p-val.]      [0.238] 
Notes:  In Model C4, profit elasticity is treated as an endogenous variable. It is instrumented with the 
following excluded exogenous variables: Herfindahl index, number of firms per branch (and year) 
and the relative net increase in the number of firms in each branch and year. 
 agejt is the average age of workers;  
 blue-collarsjt is the percentage of blue-collar workers; 
 sizejt  is the average size of firms, measured in thousands of employees; 
 K/Lj is the capital-labour ratio, measured in thousands of euro; 
 SE  coveragej is the percentage of blue-collar workers covered by single-employer collective agreements 
   */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
   t-statistics in brackets. 
 
  In order to highlight the importance of each variable for the variation of DRWR across sectors, 
Figure 2 reports the contribution of each variable to sector-specific DRWR (averaged over all 
years) based on Model C4. 
 
                                                      
16   We run several tests of validity of our set of instrumental variables. First, the F-test for joint significance of 
the excluded exogenous variables in the first stage equation confirms that the instrumental variables are 
partially correlated with profit elasticity, the endogenous variable (see Table 5). Second, the insignificant 
test statistic of the Sargan's test of overidentifying restrictions states that the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the structural error term.   20
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Figure 2 - Decomposition of DRWR based on Model C4 in Table 5 (average across years) 
 
  Figure 2 shows that the constant picks up a large part of the DRWR in all sectors. This is 
consistent with the view that national institutions drive most of the observed wage rigidity. In 
particular, full automatic indexation and collectively agreed real wage increases are natural 
potential factors of real wage rigidity.17 The value of the constant is in line with the observations 
made in Section 3.1. The standard deviation of DRWR across sectors is 0.19, around the mean of 
0.58 (see Table 2). 
  Leaving the constant aside, Figure 2 highlights the role of the different variables in explaining 
variation in DRWR across sectors. Let us first compare construction and chemicals, sectors that 
show the highest and one of the lowest values of DRWR in Table 2 (0.80 and 0.47, respectively). 
This gap may be attributed essentially to a big difference in capital intensity, firm size and SE 
agreement coverage. As shown in Table 1, the chemical industry has one of the highest capital-
labour ratios, the highest median firm size and the highest SE agreement coverage, while the 
opposite holds true for construction. As suggested by our estimates in Table 5, the higher the 
values of these variables, the lower the DRWR. These factors explain why DRWR is much higher 
in construction than in chemicals, despite the fact that construction has a disproportionately high 
percentage of blue-collar workers, while chemicals has an average proportion of blue-collar 
workers in its workforce. 
                                                      
17   This statement cannot be tested in the framework of this study. The role of national institutions may be 
better evaluated by a cross-country analysis, as in Dickens et al (2006) or the meta-analysis of Clar et al. 
(2007).   21
  In the services sector, financial and business services have similar degrees of DRWR (0.63 
and 0.67, respectively) and both sectors employ a very high proportion of white-collar workers. In 
spite of these similarities, they differ in that business services are characterised by higher capital 
intensity and financial services by higher SE agreement coverage. 
  Figure 1 shows that most DRWR is common to all sectors, and that variations across sectors 
are largely due to factors such as workforce composition, production technology (capital intensity) 
and the degree of competition on the product market. Our results also indicate that labour-intensive 
sectors have more rigid wages, which backs up the argument that price stickiness observed in 
labour-intensive sectors is due to wage rigidity. Importantly, our results point up the role of firm-
level wage bargaining in dampening wage rigidity, although Figure2 reveals that this accounts for 
only a small fraction of DRWR. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Wage rigidity has important consequences at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic level. 
When wages are rigid, they no longer evolve hand in hand with productivity developments and 
interfere with efficient allocation of resources. Downward wage rigidity is considered as one of the 
causes of unemployment and price stickiness in Europe. It also bears implications for the design 
and effectiveness of monetary policy. These findings have led to wide empirical literature on the 
evaluation of wage rigidity, based on macroeconomic, sector-level or, more recently, 
microeconomic data. The driving factors behind wage rigidity have seldom been investigated, but a 
better understanding of them can be gained simply by comparing the situation in different countries 
or sectors, for example. 
  This paper examines whether differences in wage rigidity across sectors can be explained by 
differences in workforce composition, competition, technology and wage-bargaining institutions. 
Given the institutional features of the Belgian labour market, and particularly its system of full 
automatic indexation, and considering previous findings by Du Caju et al. (2007), nominal wage 
rigidity seems to be of little relevance. We have therefore focused on downward rigidity of real 
wages, adopting the measure of downward real wage rigidity developed by Dickens and Goette 
(2006). The estimates are based on a large administrative matched employer-employee dataset for 
Belgium over the period 1990-2002. We have also used sector-level information derived from firms' 
annual accounts over the same period and the 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 waves of the Belgian 
Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). 
  Our results are derived from two sets of exercises. First, downward real wage rigidity has been 
estimated for different categories of workers (defined according to their occupation and age 
category), year and sector. We then formally tested differences in DRWR across worker types. We 
ran a regression for our estimates of DRWR as a dependent variable on worker-type dummies as 
independent variables, as well as on elements of the individual firms' pay policy such as the level of 
bonuses and earnings. Our results indicate that DRWR is significantly higher for white-collar   22
workers and younger workers. Further worker categories with higher earnings and bonuses are 
characterised by lower DRWR, conditional on their occupation and age category. 
  Second, we have focused solely on the variation in DRWR across sectors. Our estimates of 
DRWR show that there are substantial differences in DRWR across sectors. DRWR ranges from  
0.35 in transport and storage and less than 0.50 in the chemicals and non-metal industries to 0.80 
in construction. Along with variables related to workforce composition, we have included 
explanatory variables that can be suggested as determinants of DRWR, such as capital intensity, 
firm size, competition and an index for decentralised wage bargaining measured by the percentage 
of firms with firm-level agreements. All these variables have then been combined into a single 
model. We find that wages are more rigid in smaller firms and in more competitive sectors 
(measured by profit elasticity). Our results also suggest that DRWR is greater in labour-intensive 
sectors. Lastly, the impact of labour market institutions on DRWR has been taken into 
consideration as a way of capturing the decentralisation of wage bargaining. Our findings suggest 
that sectors with more centralised wage formation (i.e. with lower firm-level agreement coverage) 
have higher DRWR. Given the predominant role of sector-level collective wage bargaining in wage-
setting practices in Belgium, this indicates that firm-level collective agreements tend to enhance 
wage flexibility by taking closer account of firm-specific situations in wage determination.  
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Appendix A: Data  
 
This appendix discusses the definitions of variables employed in the paper. The subscripts used 
refer to the particular group of observations over which the variable varies. The shortcuts for 
branch, occupation, age category and year are j, k, a and t, respectively. Unless explicitly stated, 
the variables come from the same administrative database on individual labour earnings for 
Belgium collected by the social security system used in Du Caju et al. (2007). Our trimming 
procedure for annual gross earnings is explained in Section 2 of the paper. In addition, we use 
information from firms' balance sheets. Finally, we also rely on individual data from the Belgian 
Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), for the 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 waves.  
 
Wage rigidity measure 
The administrative employer-employee dataset provides individual information on annual gross 
earnings (including bonuses) and annual working days. We evaluate DRWR from the distribution of 
the changes in the log of annual earnings divided by the number of work days of full-time job 
stayers. 
 
Variables related to compensation 
Variables related to firms' pay policy are the level of earnings and the level of bonuses. Earnings 
refers to daily gross earnings of an employee and are defined as annual gross earnings in euro 
divided by the annual number of work days. Bonuses are obtained from the SES and refer to 
annual bonuses of an employee expressed in euro. We do not make use of the variation of 
bonuses over years in order to retain as many observations as possible (our main dataset covers 
the period 1991-2002, and the SES 1999-2002 only).  
 
Firm size 
We measure firm size by the number of employees. The definition of the number of employees in 
the balance sheet has changed over the period under examination. Since 1996 (and in some cases 
1997), firms have reported the total number of employees at the end of the year. Before 1996, only 
information on the average number of employees per year is available. Variables denoted as 
"Employees < 25jt" and "Employees > 499jt" refer to the percentage of firms in each branch and 
year that employ less than 25 and more than 499 employees, respectively. 
 
Capital-labour ratio 
Firm-level capital-labour ratios are computed for all firms, both public companies and non-profit 
associations, which publish annual accounts for a full year from January to December. The capital 












with Kit representing the real capital stock, P
I
st the sector-specific gross capital formation deflator 
and δi the firm-specific depreciation rate. The initial nominal capital stock is given by the book   27
accounting value of the capital stock, plus revaluation gains, minus depreciation and amounts 
writte-downs. The firm-specific depreciation rate was estimated as the median depreciation of 
expenditure on capital, over the years in which the firm is in business. Labour is defined as the 
number of employees, as above. Capital to labour ratios are taken as the median or average within 
each sector over the entire period 1991-2002 and are measured in euro. We do not consider the 
capital-labour ratio by year, because, in the short run, changes in the ratio can reflect employment 
changes rather than a change in the production technology. 
  As a robustness test, we calculate the capital-labour ratio from the national accounts data too. 
We take the net capital stock per sector at the end of the year divided by the yearly average of the 
number of workers in the branch of activity. In national accounts, the gross capital stock is 
estimated according to the perpetual inventory method, based on historical series of gross fixed 
capital formation, the average service life of fixed assets and survival functions, from which the 
cumulative value of consumption of fixed capital is deducted to obtain the net stock. We deflate the 
net capital stock using the sector-specific gross capital formation deflator at the A31 level. 
 
Competition measures 
We use a relatively new measure of competition, proposed by Boone et al. (2007), namely the 
elasticity of firms' profits with respect to marginal costs. A higher value of this profit elasticity 
suggests more intense competition. The intuition is as follows. An increase in costs lowers the 
firm's profits. As firms in less competitive markets have some market power over their prices, a 
given percentage increase in costs will lead to a smaller decline in profits than for firms in more 
competitive markets.  
  As shown in their paper, under monopoly conditions, the profit elasticity is a positive linear 
function of the demand elasticity. Consider a monopoly facing a constant elasticity demand function 
x=p
-ε, where x is output, p the output price and -ε the price elasticity of demand. With c, the 
marginal cost, the firm's profit is given by Π=x
(ε-1)/ε-cx. Profit maximisation with respect to output 
yields the following expressions for output, x=(ε-1)
ε/(εc)
ε, and profits, Π=((ε-1)
ε-1/ε
ε)c
-(ε-1). Taking the 
expression in logs yields lnΠ=ln((ε-1)
ε-1/ε
ε)-(ε-1)lnc. The profit elasticity is equal to -(ε-1). 
  Profit elasticity might also depend on marginal costs. To illustrate this, we consider the 
standard Cournot model with two firms and linear demand curve in the form p(x1,x2) = a - b1x1 - 
b2x2, where xi is the output produced by firm i, the size of the market is captured by a, and bi is 
each firm's own elasticity of demand. The cost function of each firm takes the form of C(xi) = ci xi. 
Firm i chooses its output xi so that it maximises its profits: 
  () {} i i i 2 2 1 1
x
x c x x b x b a max
i
− − −    i = { 1 , 2 }             ( a 1 )  
In addition, we assume that a > ci > 0 and that bi > 0. Solving (a1) yields a reaction function of firm i 
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=                  ( a 2 )  
In a Nash equilibrium, both firms are choosing best response to their competitor's output choice. 
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If DRWR has an impact on wages, it also influences profit elasticity through equation (a3), causing 
simultaneity in our regression models. In Model C4 in Table 5, we use instrumental variables to 
account for potential simultaneity bias. See also Boone (2000) and Boone et al. (2007) for other 
examples and more general model specifications. 
  To estimate the profit elasticity, we follow Boone et al. (2007). More specifically, we regress the 
log of profits on the log of marginal costs. Marginal variable costs are defined as variable costs 
over turnover and are denoted as "mc" in what follows. We use information on all profit-maximising 
firms that file annual accounts for the whole year from January to December. We identify outliers as 
firms with variable costs over turnover below or above the 5
th and 95
th percentile of the distribution 
and we use the same criterion for profits over total assets. For each branch of activity, we estimate 
the following regression with firm-specific fixed effects for the period 1991-2002: 
ln πit = αi + γt - βt ln mcit + εit,  
where βt is the profit elasticity and π stands for profits. 
As a robustness check, we also use the Herfindahl index as a simple measure of competition 
within each branch and year. We start by calculating the sum of the squares of the market shares 
of each individual firm within the branch. Market share is defined as the proportion of a firm's value 
added in the total value added of the branch. Finally, we re-scale the index to range from 0 to 1. 



















= ∑∑ == , 
where VAi is the value added of firm i in branch b, and Nb is the number of firms in branch b. As a 
measure of concentration, a small value of the Herfindahl index indicates a competitive industry 
with no dominant players. 
  We also consider the sector-level estimates of price-cost margins constructed by Christopoulou 
and Vermeulen (2007) for NACE 2 sectors for the US and several EU countries, including Belgium. 
The estimates are time-invariant. In cases where our sector definition is more aggregated than 
theirs, we consider the simple average of their estimated mark-ups.  
  Table A1 reports the three measures of competition as well as correlations with median firm 
size in the sector, the number of firms within the industry, the firms' entry and exit rates.  
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food  7.957 0.014  1.08 
textile  9.514 0.009  1.09 
wood and paper  7.436 0.007  1.13 
chemicals  7.809 0.029  1.16 
non-metal  8.514 0.023  1.15 
metal  8.119 0.036  1.13 
machinery and equip.  8.642 0.023  1.20 
transport equipment  9.877 0.074  1.06 
other manufacturing  9.159 0.005  1.08 
construction  8.432 0.001  1.17 
trade   9.821 0.003  1.22 
hotels and restaurants  8.189 0.013  1.23 
transport and storage  5.784 0.010  1.26 
financial services  5.473 0.012  1.44 
business services  6.007 0.003  1.78 
Mean  8.049 0.018 1.21 
Standard deviation  1.388 0.019 0.18 
Correl. with number of firms  -0.46 -0.22 0.70 
Correl. with firm entry rate  -0.08 -0.42 0.64 
Correl. with firm exit rate  -0.07 -0.42 0.63 
Correl. with firm size  0.46 0.63 -0.55 
Note:   Correlation coefficients are calculated for sectors included in the dataset. 
 
Single-employer (SE) agreement coverage 
The information on SE agreements is obtained from the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) for 
Belgium covering the period 1999-2002 with annual frequency. The dataset contains separate 
indicators of SE agreements for blue-collar and white-collar workers at the firm level and this allows 
us to match the data with the occupational categories in our paper. For instance, for blue-collar 
workers, the SE agreement coverage refers to the percentage of this category in each sector that 
work in firms with SE agreements covering blue-collar workers. 
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Appendix B: Robustness 
 
In this appendix, we consider the robustness of our results along three dimensions. Section B1 
considers the sensitivity of our estimates to alternative definitions of the variables under study. 
Section 2.3.2 discussed potential problems related to the estimation of equations (1) and (2) by the 
OLS technique. In Section B2, we consider whether the OLS estimates suffer from misspecification 
error related to the fact that our dependent variable is constrained to take values only on the 
interval [0,1]. First, we test whether the predicted values of the dependent variable (DRWR) lie 
outside the [0,1] interval. Next, we apply Ramsey's (1969) regression error specification test. 
Finally, we present estimation results based on alternative technique that takes into account the 
bounded nature of the dependent variable. More specifically, we adopt the quasi-maximum 
likelihood method (QML) developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). Section B3 corrects 
standard errors of the OLS estimates for the presence of intra-class correlation within sectors, as 
discussed in Section 2.3.2. 
 
B1  Robustness with respect to definitions of competition on the product market 
 
  In Table B1, we consider robustness of the regression models C1, C2 and C3 presented in 
Table 5 with respect to the measure of competitiveness, i.e. we replace profit elasticity by the 
Herfindahl index and by the estimated mark-ups reported in Vermeulen and Christopoulou (2007). 
In Models C1B and C2B in Table B1, the coefficient on the Herfindahl index is negative, implying 
that more concentrated industries have a lower degree of DRWR. The coefficient is insignificant in 
Model C1B but it is significant in Model C2B at the 10 percent level. The predicted effect reflects 
our findings based on profit elasticity, i.e. more competitive sectors have higher DRWR. However, 
the Herfindahl index coefficient becomes insignificant and with reverse sign once the capital-labour 
ratio is excluded. Estimates with the mark-up also deliver mixed results. The mark-up coefficient is 
not significant and its sign depends on the inclusion of capital intensity. 
  One may argue that the profit elasticity may be a more reliable measure of competition, among 
others, when increased competition leads to market concentration. However, our estimates in 
Tables 5 and B1 indicate that the relationship between product market competition and wage 
rigidity is not robust to alternative definitions of competition, and should therefore be treated with 
caution. 
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Table B2 - Robustness of models S1 and S2 in Table 5 with respect to Herfindahl index  
Dep. var. DRWRjt  Model C1B  Model C2B  Model C3B  Model C1C  Model C2C  Model C3C 
Est.  method  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
agejt 0.010      0.014    
 (0.74)      (1.02)    
blue-collarsjt  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-1.19) (-1.14) (-0.27) (-0.81) (-0.85) (-0.26) 
sizejt  -7.036 -7.061 -4.295 -7.463 -7.630 -4.188 
  (-1.28) (-1.29) (-0.74) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-0.72) 
K/Lj  -0.177*** -0.180***   -0.150*** -0.151***  
  (-4.40) (-4.52)   (-4.14) (-4.18)  
Herfindahljt -1.574  -1.708*  0.312     
     (-1.51)  (-1.67)  (0.32)       
Price Cost Marginjt     0.022  0.007  -0.027 
     (0.15)  (0.05)  (-0.17) 
SE coveragej  -0.001 -0.000 -0.004***  -0.002 -0.002 -0.004*** 
  (-0.43) (-0.07) (-2.61) (-1.52) (-1.19) (-2.61) 
Constant 0.533  0.879***  0.601*** 0.341  0.838*** 0.641** 
 (1.12)  (10.36)  (9.70)  (0.62) (3.38) (2.50) 
Year  dummies  yes  yes      
R²adj 0.252  0.254  0.162  0.241  0.241  0.162 
Number of obs.  173  173      
Notes: 
 agejt is the average age of workers;  
 blue-collarsjt is the percentage of blue-collar workers; 
 sizejt  is the average size of firms, measured in thousands of employees; 
 K/Lj is the capital-labour ratio, measured in thousands of euro; 
 SE  coveragej is the percentage of blue-collar workers covered by single-employer collective agreements 
   */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
   t-statistics in brackets. 
 
B2  Accounting for bounded dependent variable 
 
To test whether the bounded nature of the dependent variable causes misspecification of the OLS 
model, we first consider whether the predicted dependent variable in the OLS models lies within 
the natural limits of DRWR, i.e. the [0,1] interval. Indeed, we find that this is the case for all models 
considered in the paper. Second, we use the general test for specification error (RESET) proposed 
by Ramsey (1969). The test is based on the idea that if we add to our regression higher powers of 
the independent variables or the predicted dependent variable, all these variables should be jointly 
insignificant. Otherwise, there is a specification error present in our original model. For most of the 
models considered in the paper, the RESET test is inconclusive. Using higher powers of the 
predicted dependent variable, we are almost always unable to reject the null hypothesis that the 
model has no omitted variables, implying that the linear model fits the data well. On the other hand, 
the version of the RESET test that adds higher powers of the independent variables to the model 
always rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting model misspecification. 
  To emphasise our point, we consider the following generalised linear model 
  g{ E(y) } = Xβ,      y   ~   B e r n o u l l i                       ( 3 )  
where y is the dependent variable following Bernoulli distribution and g{·} is a logit function. This 
specification was suggested by Papke and Wooldrige (1996), who estimate such a model with   32
quasi-maximum likelihood method (QML). Tables B2 to B4 provide estimates of the same models 
as Tables 3 to 5 in the main text using the QML method instead of OLS. In line with the conclusion 
of the RESET test, we find that the coefficient estimates by OLS and QML are very similar. 
 
Table B2 - DRWR per year, occupation, age category and sector, QML estimates, cf. Table 3 
Dep. v. DRWRkajt  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (4)  Model (3) 
D white-collarkajt 0.071*** 0.087*** 0.135*** 0.112*** 
  (4.05) (5.21) (5.17) (5.10) 
D age:25-44kajt -0.052**  -0.060***  -0.022 -0.023 
  (-2.40) (-2.77) (-0.88) (-0.92) 
D age:45+kajt -0.033  -0.048**  0.006  0.017 
 (-1.42)  (-2.04)  (0.22)  (0.58) 
bonuskaj
†     -0.031***   
         (-2.97)   
earningskajt
†     -1.850*** 
           (-2.87) 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Sector  dummies  no yes  no no 
Number of obs.  758  758  758  758 
Notes:  The table presents marginal effects of the QML estimates. 
 
† measured in thousands of euro.   
    */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
    t-statistics in brackets. 
 
Table B3 - Sector-specific factors affecting DRWR, QML estimates, cf. Table 4 
Dep. var. DRWRjt  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
agejt  -0.022*  -0.007 -0.012 -0.021*  0.016 
        (-1.87) (-0.55) (-1.01) (-1.81) (1.10) 
blue-collarsjt -0.000  0.001  -0.002**  -0.001  -0.000 
     (-0.41)  (0.72)  (-2.32)  (-1.58)  (-0.75) 
sizejt    -14.063***    
       (-3.16)      
K/Lj     -0.018***    
     (-5.81)    
Profit elasticityjt      0.030***   
       (2.65)   
SE coverage       -0.005*** 
       (-4.16) 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector  dummies  no no no no no 
Number  of  obs.  173 173 173 173 173 
Notes:  The table presents marginal effects of the QML estimates.    
 agejt is the average age of workers;  
 blue-collarsjt is the percentage of blue-collar workers; 
 sizejt  is the average size of firms, measured in thousands of employees; 
 K/Lj is the capital-labour ratio, measured in thousands of euro; 
 SE  coveragej is the percentage of blue-collar workers covered by single-employer collective agreements 
   */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
   t-statistics in brackets. 
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Table B4 - Explaining differences in DRWR across sectors, composite models, QML 
Dep. var. DRWRjt  Model C1  Model C2  Model C3 
Est. method  QML  QML  QML 
agejt 0.017     
     (1.17)     
blue-collarsjt -0.001*  -0.001  -0.001 
     (-1.72)  (-1.64)  (-1.47) 
sizejt -11.391**  -11.168**  -12.354** 
     (-2.13)  (-2.13)  (-2.37) 
K/Lj -0.011***  -0.012***   
 (-2.94)  (-3.17)   
Profit elasticityjt 0.025*  0.022  0.044*** 
   (1.71)  (1.57)  (3.41) 
SE coverage  -0.003*  -0.002  -0.003** 
 (-1.88)  (-1.57)  (-2.43) 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes 
Sector dummies  no  no  no 
Number of obs.  173  173  173 
Notes:  The table presents marginal effects of the QML estimates. 
 agejt is the average age of workers;  
 blue-collarsjt is the percentage of blue-collar workers; 
 sizejt is the average size of firms, measured in thousands of employees; 
 K/Lj is the capital-labour ratio, measured in thousands of euro; 
 SE  coveragej is the percentage of blue-collar workers covered by single-employer collective agreements 
   */**/*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
   t-statistics in brackets. 
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